COVID‐19 as a matter of governance provides an opportunity for questioning taken‐for‐granted assumptions of 'states of exception' (Agamben [2005](#soca12825-bib-0001){ref-type="ref"}) in the political mechanics of emergency rule. In Russia, for example, a zone of anomie is currently being produced that operates not within existing emergency laws but as what I call a new 'legal void'.

Contemporary Russian law provides two versions of emergency regimes: 'an emergency situation' (*chrezvychainaia situatsiia*, or *ChS*) and 'the state of emergency' (*chrezvychainoe polozhenie*, or *ChP*). The first one has been used in disaster management since 1994. It is introduced at multiple administration levels for an indefinite time by decrees of the heads of corresponding administrations. The *ChS* regime has been applied in many situations, from a bridge in an unsafe condition to forest fires. The law on *ChP* was set to serve both political disorders and disasters, including epidemics. Unlike the *ChS* regime, it can be introduced only by the President and for a fixed term. It has never been implemented since its adoption in 2001.

Both of the laws suspend some civil rights but also provide guarantees of compensation for harm to health, property damage and even for just living in the emergency zone. *ChP* law also details legal procedures such as detention and litigation under the state of emergency.

However, to date, Russia's authorities are not using either of these special legal regimes in their pandemic governance. Most Russian regions have declared pre‐emergency 'high alerts', and new restrictions have been introduced in amendments to these decrees. This *non‐declaration* of emergency limits the rights of citizens and business owners to claim compensation for any kind of losses due to the legally 'normal' situation.

This is what I describe as government producing a new legal void. The high alert decrees institute 'regime of self‐isolation' (*rezhim samoizoliatsii*), 'distance work' (*udalionnaia* or *distantsionnaia rabota*) and 'quarantine' (*karantin*) -- all absent in Russian law. In his appeal to the nation on 25 March and the subsequent decree, President Putin mentioned 'non‐working days' (*nerabochie dni*), while the Labour Code only refers to working days, weekends and holidays. These new terms have perlocutionary effect of legally binding acts that themselves have no basis in Russian law.

In this particular case, Putin's government has advanced what some scholars describe as 'counterfeiting of legality' (Rigi [2012](#soca12825-bib-0002){ref-type="ref"}: 81--83) by 'hybridisation' of emergency itself. Ironically, the Agambenian logic of the sovereign power is being perpetuated not through a declaration of emergency but the sovereign's withdrawal from it. But how atypical is Russia here? I wonder if this is just a Russian state of exception to Agamben's state of exception -- or if Agamben's concept needs a more global rethinking in the current situation.
